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NIETZSCHE ?ND THE FUTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY 
Gary Shapiro 
Nietzsche's first generation of readers tended to see him as a 
thinker, philosopher or prophet of the future; he was the teacher 
of the superman, the transvaluator of all values, the founder of 
a new philosophy of the will to power. In the many discourses of 
the early twentieth century that are devoted in various ways to 
'Nietzsche and the Future* there are obvious signs of the 
nineteenth century cult of progress, although interpreted 
divergently by social Darwinism, socialism or anarchism. Now we 
are more sophisticated. Those first readers saw Nietzsche as 
radicalizing and rewriting the modernist metanarrative 
(substituting the superman for Hegel's absolute spirit or the 
good European for Marx's proletariat). Now we read Nietzsche as 
the paradigmatic postmodern philosopher, providing a genealogy 
and a deconstruction of those modernist metanarratives. He does 
not offer simply one more transformation 
- whether vitalist, 
anarchist or proto-Nazi 
- of such grand stories of legitimation 
but rigorously and vigilantly undermines the claims to uniqueness 
and legitimation that one finds in the enlightenment tradition (a 
tradition that includes, in the nineteenth century, such 
representative thinkers as Hegel, Marx, J.S. Mill, Ernest Renan, 
Comte, Herbert Spencer and Charles Peirce). Our Nietzsche is the 
radical critic of such future oriented thinking. He is the 
analyst of the advantages and disadvantages of history for life 
and the thinker of the thought of eternal recurrence that puts 
the concept of history into question. Above all he exposes that 
logic of ressentiment by which the future is laid under the 
obligation of redeeming the debts of the past. 
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Such a summary or caricature of what has been called 'the new 
Nietzsche' is inadequate to the extent that it does not provide 
an account of the function of the future (or, more generally, of 
the role of narrative) in Nietzsche's texts. It might be thought 
that the future appears there only as an early aberration; The 
Birth of Tragedy of 1872 does ally itself with Wagner's 
Zukunftsmusik and the polemics stimulated by the book turn on 
such associations - the establishment classicist Wilamowitz 
ridiculed it as a Zukunftsphi 1 o 1 ogie to which Nietzsche's friend 
Rohde riposted that such charges were symptomatic of 
Aft er Philologie (that is, an ass-backwards philology). In 1886, 
Nietzsche described the smell of The Birth of Tragedy as 
'offensively Hegelian', suggesting, perhaps, that it was not only 
dialectical but teleological, offering a story of the return at a 
new and higher level of a tragic culture that had been displaced 
by Socratic man. Yet in the same year Nietzsche subtitles Beyond 
Good and Evil 'Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future' and the 
rhetoric of that book plays a constant game of seduction with its 
readers, inviting them to identify themselves as such future 
philosophers. Here, we might say, Nietzsche is writing the 
future both in the sense of communicating with it (and 
consequently becoming its past to be read and interpreted) and in 
the prescriptive sense of laying grounds or conditions for that 
future. But 'writing the future' may also mean textualizing the 
future, that is, producing and analyzing the role that the future 
plays in certain significant bodies of discourse. 
I propose to interrogate Nietzsche's text/lectures Uber Die 
Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten as an exemplary site of such 
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textualization of the future. In the antiquated English 
translation the title is rendered as The Future of Our 
Educational Institutions. But Bildung carries with it narrative 
suggestions as in the BiIdunqsroman. Bildung is attained 
culture, and so it is not surprising that Nietzsche's lectures 
tell a story concerning the younger generation's quest for 
culture, their search for the path of their own 
Bildung/formation, and the realism or cynicism of a retired 
professor who claims in effect that a Bildungsanstalt is (at 
least in nineteenth century German) an oxymoron? from his point 
of view the university must be described ironically as 'a 
cultural machine': 
One speaking mouth, with many ears, and half as many 
writing hands 
- there you have, to all appearances, the 
external academic apparatus; there you have the 
university culture machine in action. (KSA 1, 740)* 
Within the Goethean-Hegelian discourse of Bildung there may be a 
cultural institution; for example the university as envisioned by 
thinkers like Wilhelm von Humboldt; but to speak of a 'culture 
machine' is to expose a latent contradiction in the ideal of an 
organic social synthesis which allows the university to play the 
role that it does in social and political legitimation. 
I want to suggest that The Future of our Cultural (or Formative 
or Acculturating) Institutions displays the intersection of two 
significant Nietzschean themes. The first, addressed with 
typical perspicacity by Derrida in The Ear of the Other, has to 
do with the philosophemes of writing and speaking and all that 
they bring with them. The second involves the question of 
narrative and its place in philosophy. In the space traversed by 
these two themes, that is, in the university of Nietzsche's 
fiction, we can discern the social and political institution 
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which most obviously impinges on both the texts and the man that 
we call Nietzsche. It is on that site that we might begin an 
inquiry into the Nietzschean political unconscious; so far the 
only example of such an inquiry is the crudely reductionist 
account to be found in Lukacs' The Destruction of Reason. 
Let me suggest, somewhat impressionistically, the outlines of 
such a contextualizing analysis by invoking one of Nietzsche's 
most significant 'others', that paradigmatical ly logocentric 
historian and university-man, Jacob Burckhardt. Young Nietzsche 
revered Burckhardt above all of his other colleagues at Basel and 
during his 'collapse' in Turin in January 1889 he wrote to him: 
Dear Professor 
Actually I would much rather be a Basel professor than 
God; but I have not ventured to carry my private egoism 
so far as to omit creating the world on this account. 
You see, one must make sacrifices, however and wherever 3 one may be living... 
(That letter sent Burckhardt to Overbeck who brought Nietsche 
back to a clinic, whence he was returned to the mother and sister 
whom he called the greatest obstacle to the thought of eternal 
recurrence; the professors sent Nietzsche back home to the 
private world from which he had once escaped to the university). 
When Burckhardt was installed in the Basel Lehrstuhl he gave up 
writing for publication; he was a hypochondriac who saw writing 
as a Pharmakon dangerous to his health. But Burckhardt was also 
concerned with the health of the body politic; the corollary of 
his cultural pessimism and political conservatism was the belief 
that sparks of the grand European tradition could be preserved 
only by direct communication between a wise judge of that past 
and an appropriate audience. That communication must take the 
form of a living narrative that avoids the descent into minutiae 
characteristic of the historical monograph. 'You had to hear him 
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to get the point', we say about such teachers when they manage to 
transform themselves into cultural institutions. Each 
performance was both contextualized to the immediate concerns of 
the day and yet had the scope of a 'world historical reflection'. 
Implicit in such practice is another narrative, one which tells 
about the Bildung of our Bildungsanstalten, or the formation of 
formative institutions. It tells how there came to be historians 
and their audiences within the site of the university. These 
metanarratives show us how these institutions succeed or fail at 
the task of social and cultural legitimation. Here we might 
mention the explicit and implicit foundation narratives of 
Wilhelm von Humboldt. By the end of the nineteenth century the 
German model was available for export to the world and it arrived 
with metanarrative accompaniments. Consider for example the 
philosopher Friedrich Paulsen's The German University, an 
encyclopedic work of what we might now call applied ethics in 
which he attempts to demonstrate the validity of the lecture 
method, the division of the faculties, and the need for a Jewish 
quota of the professoriate. Paulsen's work is, as Hayden White 
would say, a piece of comic, organicist, synecdochic narrative 
exemplifying the arrogant conservatism of Germany at the turn of 
the century. Paulsen's book was widely translated; in the 
United States Nicholas Murray Butler, philosopher and president 
of Columbia, wrote an introduction for it, hailing it as 
establishing the paradigm for American universities. In more 
recent years the narratives of the German university have 
understandably been cast in more tragic tones: I cite two titles 
- Fritz Ringer's The Decline of the German Mandarins and Daniel 
FalIon's The German University: A Heroic Ideal in Conflict with 
the Modern World. 
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Nietzsche's story. The Future of our Cultural Institutions must 
be read against such metanarratives in which the university 
succeeds or fails in playing a central legitimizing role. The 
university is involved in social legitimation in a variety of 
ways. As Jean-Francois Lyotard points out in The Postmodern 
Condition, the university may be seen as the embodiment of 
knowledge, where society is construed as justified by its 
production of heroes of knowledge.4 This, we might say, is the 
classical (Hegelian) European metanarrative of the university. A 
second form of legitimation is more typical of the United States, 
in which the university legitimates the social future by 
promising to provide the training and credentials necessaryfor 
social status to correspond to ability and effort rather than to 
inherited wealth or class. Read in relation to these intertexts 
of various dates, the gaps and ruptures of Nietzsche's narrative 
are thrown into relief. The first has to do with the scene of 
instruction itself. The old philosopher interrogates the 
independence of mind said to be the goal of the German 
university: 
Permit me however to measure this autonomy (or 
independence, Selbst?ndigkeit) of yours by the standard 
of this culture (Bildung), and to consider your 
university solely as a cultural establishment. If a 
foreigner desires to know something of our university 
system, he first of all asks emphatically: 'How is the 
student connected with (h?ngt zusammen) the 
university?' We answer: 'By the ear, as a listener 
(H?rer). 'Only by the ear?' he asks once more. 'Only 
by the ear, we reply once more. The student listens. 
When he speaks, when he sees, when he walks, when he 
socializes, when he practices some art: in brief, when 
he lives he is autonomous that is, independent of the 
cultural institution. Very often the student writes at 
the same time that he listens; and it is only at these 
moments that he hangs by the umbilical cord of the 
university. 
(KSA, 1, 739) 
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Here is an inversion of the paradox of Plato's Phaedrus: there a 
written philosophical text is apparently the instrument for the 
condemnation of writing, while Nietzsche's lectures are directed 
against the lecture method itself. Although delivered as a set 
of lectures and never published by its author, the text was 
provided with a brief Vorrede. This Vorrede he says, is to be 
read before the lectures 'although it really has nothing to do 
with them' (KSA 1,648). In this anomalous text Nietzsche 
imagines a careful, slow, patient reader closely resembling the 
ideal reader described in his lectures on rhetoric. In these 
lectures or Bildunqsanstalten which depict the merely listening 
student (H?rer) as hanging on the umbilical cord of the 
university, Nietzsche constantly reminds his audience of their 
own status, addressing them even in the midst of the lecture as 
meine verehrte Zuh?rer. Perhaps the appropriate reader response 
would be to leave the lecture at such a point, thus breaking the 
umbilical cord. But the text seems to be sufficiently complex 
to preclude this as the only responsible option. 
The structure of displacement is further intensified by the 
nature of the narrative or fiction that Nietzsche constructs 
about the German university (and not the Swiss one where he 
actually teaches; German institutions are both ours and not ours, 
Nietzsche seems to be saying). Because the story is unfinished 
its genre is uncertain. The last lecture, although announced, 
was not delivered and apparently was never written. But the 
lectures might be seen as an incomplete comedy. The story 
concerns two students, one of them said to be Nietzsche (so the 
lecturing professor appears before students portrayed or masked 
as a student) who are part of a culture club, an association for 
mutual improvement. They encounter a venerable but gruff old 
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philosopher and his companion in the mountains. A ludicrous 
struggle over turf ensues, for both parties claim the same site 
for a prearranged meeting. After a territorial accommodation is 
reached the students become eavesdroppers (Zuh?rer), listening in 
while the old philosopher details his critique of the Gymnasium 
and university system. Towards the end of the extant lecture 
course there is some indication that the rest of the students' 
companions have joined with the philosopher's friend(s) in the 
valley below where there is singing and torchlight. The comedic 
expectation then is that students and professors have reached 
some community of understanding about their cultural institution, 
despite the emeritus philosopher's abhorrence of students in 
groups. But the signs remain unfulfilled. The effect was 
heightened for Nietzsche's listeners ('hanging on the umbilical 
cord of the university?') by the fact that he gave one lecture a 
week, and so holding out the prospect of providing a true path of 
Bjldung. One is tempted to read the break in the story in the 
light of another of the lecturer's introductory remarks: 
Thus, while I disclaim all desire of being taken for an 
uninvited adviser on questions relating to the schools 
and the University of Basel, I repudiate even more 
emphatically still the role of a prophet standing on 
the horizon of civilization and pretending to predict 
the future of education and scholastic organisation 
(KSA, 1, 694). 
In other words, Nietzsche eludes the comic resolution by giving 
us an incomplete narrative that leaves us, teachers and students, 
in a somewhat indeterminate situation, like the characters in his 
fiction. As with some Nietzschean aphorisms we are left to fill 
in the space opened out by the text by ourselves. The lack of 
closure in these lectures marks a break with Hegelian narrative. 
Despite Hegel's renunciation of prophecy, as in his saying that 
the owl of Minerva takes flight only when the shades of night 
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are falling1, it is only a minor alteration in the progranme of 
Hegelian history to place the comedic resolution which he saw in 
the present (that is, his own present) in a future that is 
already dawning. 
Nietzsche rejects Hegelian absolute narrative and its master 
plot; but to leave the narrative open, as he does in these 
lectures, is not to avoid narrative altogether. Let me suggest 
that the interval between The Birth of Tragedy and these lectures 
constitutes an epistemological break, one which makes Nietzsche's 
abandonment of metanarrative models and ushers in what we might 
call, telegraphically, a pluralistic, postmodern approach to 
narrative. In Derrida's two discussions of Nietzsche the 
question of narrative is hardly touched. Spurs proceeds by 
taking what might be a micronarrative ('I forgot my umbrella') 
and arguing that it is too indetermine for any interpretation, 
narrative or other wise. In his essay on 'Otobiographies' 
Derrida calls our attention to Nietzsche's figure of the ear in 
its labyrinthine modalities, but omits to point out either the 
conventional narrative structure of the text or the effect 
produced by its breaking off. 
Also omitted from the story is precisely that process of Bildung 
by which the young Nietzsche who eavesdrops on the distinguished 
professor has grown to be the lecturer who stands before the 
university to question its fetishization of orality. But this 
very absence suggests that the cultural machine itself does not 
supply the means for achieving a fluent and continuous Bildung. 
The Bildung of Nietzsche the lecturer is inscribed in the young 
Nietzsche of the fiction only negatively, that is, in so far as 
he has a premonition of the impossibility of the university 
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living up to the story it tells about itself. If the lecturing 
Nietzsche of 1872 exemplifies Bildung, he does not do so as a 
product of the university culture-machine he describes. Perhaps 
he does so only because he has eavesdropped on tales told out of 
school, which would suggest that the 'truth1 of the university 
(in a Hegelian sense) is its gossip and politics. Then again, 
Nietzsche makes no explicit claim to be a man of culture? it may 
be that he gave up the project just as he now breaks off the 
narrative. A decade later in Zarathustra we find the 
denunciation of 'the land of Bildung', in which modorn, 
scholarly, historicist man is described as hiding his own 
emptiness: 
With the characters of the past inscribed all over you, 
and these characters in turn painted over with new 
characters: thus have you concealed yourselves 
perfectly from all interpreters of characters.^ 
Let us recall now that Nietzsche entitled his lectures Uber die 
Zukunft unserer Bi 1 dungsansta 1 ten. The old translation omits any 
equivalent to Uber, implicitly translating it as 'on' or 'about*. 
But this preposition is a weighty one in Nietzsche's 
philosophical German, as it is in Heidegger's Uber die Linie. 
Beyond the future' might suggest that the future of the 
Bildungsanstalten is already inscribed in its machinery. That 
future, given its determined place in a series of legitimizing 
metanarratives, is already a past. We can see that future all 
too clearly, the old philosopher says in effect. The task is 
perhaps to think beyond that future. To do so we must think 
beyond the politico-narratological principles that circumscribe 
the enormous and still burgeoning series of reports, conferences, 
studies and research projects that bear titles that are variants 
upon 'the future of the university'. 
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The rest of Nietzsche's story is known: he left the university 
and so became a writer rather than a speaker. And instead of 
constructing one giant metanarrative of legitimation in the style 
of the university's discourse, he wrote that extraordinary range 
of genealogies, deconstructive narratives, mythical histories and 
pluralizing aphorisms that we see in his texts. He transvalued 
the motley collection of signs called Bi1 dung by a 
carnivalization of its costumes and disguises (cf. the discussion 
of a 'carnival in the grand style' in Beyond Good and Evil, para. 
223) 
However, I do not want to suggest that the encounter with the 
university is to be reduced simply to a phase in Nietzsche's own 
Bildung. Rather the Nietzschean text is susceptible of a reading 
that recognizes the concrete cultural formations which are its 
context, matrix, and principal antagonists. Let me just suggest 
how we might read that narrative of such obsessive interest to 
Heidegger and Derrida, 'How the True World Finally Became a 
Fable' in this perspective. In this sketch that seems to reduce 
the history of philosophy to comic-book proportions, Nietzsche 
chronicles the fate of what we now call the metaphysics of 
presence. But it is clear that Nietzsche never sees such 
histories along idealist lines as the intrinsic development of an 
idea; each of the six phases that he notes is marked by names and 
stage directions that suggest how it is related to specific 
practices, institutions, and discourses. Each stage direction 
indicates a certain scene of instruction. Consider Nietzsche's 
account of Plato as an analysis of the Platonic academy and its 
many revivals: 
1. The true world - attainable for the sage, the pious, 
the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. (The oldest 
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form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and 
persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, 'I, 
Plato am the truth.1) 
The wise man identical with the truth: a teaching that will be 
appealing to the wise but forbidding for others, and in any case 
subject to envious charges of elitism. By valorizing the 
imaginary identification of the 'I* and truth (in Lacan's sense 
of the imaginary), it serves an ideological function. The ideal 
university for the Platonist would consist only of enlightened 
professors (no students need apply). 
If Christianity is 'Platonism for the people' and the true world 
is available in the next world following a certain askesis in 
this one, then we have the idea of a deferred truth which holds 
out the possibility of a link between the ignorant and the wise. 
With lots of work even a 'dumb ox' like Aquinas can become one of 
the wise; the Christian university and Christian metaphysics are 
expressions of the same structure. After this, metanarratives of 
enlightenment will revolve around the progress 
- conclusive or 
asymptotic 
- which the institution makes toward the truth. In 
this displacement of the imaginary the future will be the site at 
which the professor coincides with the truth. The Kantian 
university will forever be divided into its several faculties, 
just as the human faculties of understanding, will and feeling 
(taste) will constitute separate realms; the rapprochement which 
the 'lower' faculty of philosophical critique offers to the 
former and which the experience of beauty and genius offers to 
the latter constitute what Nietzsche calls 'the old sun' - i.e. 
the Platonic sun ' 'seen through mist and skepticism*. This 
contains, in germ, Nietzsche's critique of Kantian aesthetics as 
a foggy solution to an erroneously stated problem. The 
positivistic university eliminates the unknown and unknowable 
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alleged ground of the unity of these 'faculties': the unknowable 
cannot be relevant to the ongoing search for the pattern of 
appearances. It has no place in Wissenschaft. 
But, Nietzsche asks in the fifth stage of his narrative, why not 
abolish the idea of the 'true world' altogether? In this case we 
need no longer think of the positive, the apparent, and the 
empirical as merely this-worldly; so positivism is replaced by 
exuberant forms of this-worldliness. In the university these 
forms range from the insidious Nietzschean influences already 
noted with alarm by Friedrich Paulsen around 1900, to the Deweyan 
pragmatism of the 1930s and 1940s, to the politico-erotic 
utopianism of Herbert Marcuse and Norman 0. Brown in the 1960s.6 
The carnivalesque developments that we associate with 1968 embody 
what Nietzsche calls, in his stage direction to the fifth and 
penultimate part, a 'pandemonium of all free spirits'. Now 
Nietzsche also suggested that one day chairs would be established 
in universities for the teaching of Zarathustra. Presumably he 
did not mean that Zarathustra was to be taught as Platonic truth, 
or deferred in a Christian or Kantian fashion, or reduced in 
positivistic style to a literary document in the style of 
nineteenth century literary history. It was of course one (or 
several) of the voices or texts that entered into the 'pandemonium 
of free spirits'. But suppose we think of Foucault, Derrida, 
Deleuze- and the Yale critics as occupying those chairs endowed in 
Nietzsche's name. Then consider the displaced projection of such 
a university: 
6. The true world - we have abolished. What world has 
remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no. With the 
true world we have also abolished the apparent one. 
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the 
longest error; high point of humanity; (INCIPIT 
ZARATHUSTRA). 
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Might we not read this text as something like a historical 
transcendental deduction of genealogy, deconstruction and other 
tendencies that seek to write the future of the university by 
rejecting precisely those binary oppositions between presence and 
absence, truth and error, current inquiry and ultimate settled 
results which have structured the devolution that Nietzsche 
traces? Certainly we must avoid the temptation of supposing that 
Nietzsche is providing one more right-Hegelian justification of 
the present (our present) or one more left-Hegelian projection of 
a legitimate future. Moreover, we must recall that no academic 
orientations, despite and because of their connection with the 
university can claim an immunity from the word-processing whether 
of the acroamatic variety that valorizes the ear or the digital 
kind in which the machine is no longer merely a metaphor. 
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